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Abstract

Well-designed competition policy can promote consumer welfare and economic
growth. Poorly designed policy can retard both. As China’s importance in the
world economy grows steadily each year, so does the importance of its competition policy. Because China is a low-cost manufacturing center and home to an
enormous market, foreign companies have invested in China extensively, including through joint ventures with Chinese companies that involve sharing the foreign
companies’ intellectual property rights with their Chinese partners.
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China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law:
Highlights for Foreign Business
Introduction
Well-designed competition policy can
promote consumer welfare and economic
growth. Poorly designed policy can retard
both. As China’s importance in the world
economy grows steadily each year, so does
the importance of its competition policy.
Because China is a low-cost manufacturing
center and home to an enormous market,
foreign companies have invested in China
extensively, including through joint ventures
with Chinese companies that involve
sharing the foreign companies’ intellectual
property rights with their Chinese partners.
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China has been working on anti-monopoly
legislation for about ten years. Under
the Provisional Rules, foreign merger
notiﬁcation has technically been in force
since 2003, and increasingly foreign
corporations are complying with these
requirements.1 Since China’s 2001 entry
into the World Trade Organization, these
efforts have been gaining momentum. It
is now expected that the legislation will
be enacted by the end of next year.2

The Chinese government released the
latest draft of the proposed Anti-Monopoly
Law (Draft) in early April and hosted an
International Seminar on the Draft at the
end of May. Shortly before the Seminar,
the American Bar Association (ABA)
Sections on Antitrust Law, Intellectual
Property Law and International Law
jointly submitted comments on the Draft.
The April Draft, as the Sections note,
represents a marked improvement over
the previous 2002 draft, but continues to
include some provisions that should be of
concern to US and European companies
doing business in China, particularly as
it involves the licensing of IP rights.
Article 56 provides that the Anti-Monopoly
Law will not apply generally to the exercise
of IP rights, unless they qualify as an “abuse”
of those rights that violates the law. The
Draft, however, does not deﬁne what
conduct constitutes an “abuse” so that
any violation of the law could, in theory
at least, be found to be an “abuse.” This
is of particularly great concern given the
widespread piracy of intellectual property
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1. The Provisional Rules on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors (the Provisional Rules), issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), took effect on April 12, 2003.
2. Passing anti-monopoly laws is on the current legislative plan of the 10th National People’s Congress,
whose ﬁve-year term ends in March 2008. See Wang Xiaoye, Recent Developments in Chinese Antitrust
Law, Address Before the American Bar Association (Oct. 5, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/committees/international/international_word_docs/speech_to_aba_on_oct.5.doc).
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for which China is already infamous. (It
has been estimated, for example, that
90% of DVDs sold in China are pirated.)
It would be a serious mistake, for
example, if the Anti-Monopoly Law were
applied to require compulsory licensing
of valuable IP rights at royalty levels that
did not allow their owners to earn an
adequate return on their investment in
a misguided effort to assist domestic
Chinese manufacturers, or to prohibit
foreign licensors from retaining IP rights in
derivative technologies created by Chinese
licensees. Fortunately, the drafters have said
that they are open to recommendations
on how to deﬁne or narrow the
meaning of “abuse” in Article 56.
In this bulletin, we describe the key
provisions of the proposed Anti-Monopoly
Law. In the course of so doing, we identify
the principal outstanding issues so that
our clients doing business with China
will understand the risks they may face
if the law is enacted in its current form.

The April Draft provides
that the principal purpose
of the law is to “prohibit
monopolistic conduct,”
replacing the previous
draft’s purpose of
“prohibiting monopoly.”

Key Features of the Draft Law
Objectives
The April Draft provides that the principal
purpose of the law is to “prohibit
monopolistic conduct,” replacing the
previous draft’s purpose of “prohibiting
monopoly.” This revision brings the law
more in line with prevailing international
norms, which recognize that monopolies
that result from “superior skill, foresight
and industry” should not be unlawful, and
that antitrust laws should instead focus
on preventing monopolies from being
achieved or maintained by exclusionary
or predatory conduct, rather than
through competition on the merits.3

3.

We remain concerned, however, that
Article 1 continues to identify additional,
more amorphous objectives such as
“ensuring the healthy development of the
socialist market economy.” In the United
States and Europe, competition law is now
seen as serving a single over-riding purpose:
to enhance consumer welfare by protecting
competition.4 As a top economist in the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division
says, “Efﬁciency is the goal; competition
is the process.”5 In addition, the Draft
continues to use unduly vague terms, such
as “unfair prices,” in some articles. The
combination of multiple objectives and
vague terminology leaves a great deal of
discretion in the hands of the administrators
of the law, thereby creating a real danger
that the law may be misapplied to regulate
competition, rather than to protect it.

Substantive Provisions
The substantive provisions of the
proposed legislation are organized into
eight chapters. Of greatest interest to
foreign companies are the second, third
and fourth chapters, regarding Monopoly
Agreements, Abuses of Dominant Market
Position and Control of Concentrations,
respectively. These chapters deﬁne the
offenses under the proposed law.

Chapter 2: Prohibiting
Monopoly Agreements
Chapter 2 deﬁnes the types of agreements
the law will prohibit as monopolistic.
Article 8 provides that the law will treat
as monopolistic agreements to (i) ﬁx,
maintain or change prices of products; (ii)
limit the output or sale of products; (iii)
allocate sales markets or raw materials
purchasing markets; (iv) limit the purchase

See United States v. Aluminum Company of American (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

4. Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual
Property Law and International Law on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China 2 (May 19, 2005) [2005 Joint Submission] (available at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/jt-pdf/joint-comments/abaprcat2005ﬁnalcombowapp.pdf).
5. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, The
Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth, Address Before the TokyoAmerica
Center (Nov. 12, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200484.htm).
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of new technology or new facilities, or the
development of new products or new
technology; (v) jointly boycott transactions;
(vi) limit resale prices; or (vii) rig bids.
Article 9, in turn, exempts from Article 8
agreements that improve product quality,
reduce cost or increase efﬁciency, so
long as they will not completely eliminate
competition and so long as those beneﬁts
are likely to be passed on to consumers.
The new draft of Chapter 2 is a major
improvement over earlier versions. The
drafters appear to be following the lead of
the European Union in moving away from
an individual exemption system toward
a US-style rule-of-reason approach. This
approach should permit agreements that
have the potential to create efﬁciencies and
thereby enhance competition without the
need for such agreements to be submitted
to the competition authority for approval.
The new draft of Chapter 2, however,
continues to fail to distinguish between
vertical and horizontal agreements, whether
with respect to products, prices or IP rights.
This may not necessarily be a problem
if the law is implemented in a manner
that recognizes that vertical agreements
should be treated more liberally than
horizontal agreements, but it highlights the
importance of getting implementation right.

Chapter 3: Prohibition of Abuse
of Dominant Market Position
Chapter 3 deﬁnes and prohibits “abuse
of a dominant market position.” Unlike
Chapter 2, this Chapter continues to
suffer from serious, fundamental defects,
thereby creating a risk that the law will
be used to regulate business conduct
in a manner that would be antithetical
to sound competition principles. There
are four main areas of concern: the
recognition of shared monopolies, the
strong presumption of market power
from market share, the prohibition on
excessive pricing, and the inclusion of an
overbroad essential facilities doctrine.

6.

First, Article 13 deﬁnes “dominant market
position” as “the market power of one
or several undertaking(s) to determine,
maintain, or alter the price, quantity,
or other trading conditions of relevant
products so as to eliminate or restrict
competition within the relevant market.”
This deﬁnition makes it possible for two
or more entities to be found jointly to
have a “shared monopoly,” even if they
do not coordinate their conduct. This
would be contrary to the competition
laws of both the United States and the
European Union, which do not recognize
any similar concept of “shared monopoly”
without further evidence of concerted
conduct with anti-competitive effects.
Second, Article 15 establishes a
presumption of dominance based on
market share thresholds as low as 50% for
a single ﬁrm. This risks extending the law so
that it can be used to regulate the normal
competitive conduct of ﬁrms that have little,
if any, real market power. Article 15 also
creates a presumption of joint dominance
where two undertakings jointly occupy
2/3 of the market, or three undertakings
jointly occupy 3/4 of the market. These
thresholds ignore the economic reality that
many sectors can be ﬁercely competitive
with only two or three strong ﬁrms.
Third, contrary to law and practice in
the United States and the European
Union, Article 16 prohibits undertakings
with dominant market positions from
selling or buying products at prices that
are “unfair,” i.e., too high or too low. This
prohibition could be read to empower
the administrator of the law to act
effectively as a price regulator, “a role that
is antithetical to an efﬁciently functioning
market system, and likely to harm
competition and, ultimately, consumers.”6
We recognize that China has a history of
imposing ﬁxed or, more recently, guidance
prices on commodities. We believe that
China should continue to move away
from price regulation, rather than create

[Chapter 3] continues
to suffer from serious,
fundamental defects,
thereby creating a
risk that the law will
be used to regulate
business conduct in a
manner that would be
antithetical to sound
competition principles.

2005 Joint Submission, supra note 3, at 17.
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a fresh basis for price regulation under
the rubric of anti-monopoly regulation.
Fourth, and ﬁnally, Article 22 of the
new draft embraces the essential
facilities doctrine, and would prohibit
an undertaking in a dominant market
position from “refusing to deal with
other undertakings that seek access
to its infrastructure or other essential
facilities with reasonable price offers,” if
the other undertakings are unable to
compete with the dominant undertaking
without such access. This provision raises
particular concern with respect to IP
rights. The essential facilities doctrine
has been held not to apply to IP rights
in the United States,7 and can be applied
to IP rights in the European Union only
in “exceptional circumstances.”8 Using
competition laws to compel access
to valuable IP risks undermining the
incentives to invest and innovate and
would, therefore, be antithetical to the
fundamental objectives of those laws. At
the May Seminar on the Draft held in
Beijing, the drafters argued that the law was
aimed at “physical networks,” speciﬁcally
telecom networks, and not IP rights, but
the language of the draft law provides
no such limitation, again emphasizing the
importance of proper implementation.

Chapter 4 of the
AML will establish
new procedures for
merger clearance for
all transactions, both
domestic and foreign.

Chapter 4: Control of
Concentrations
China in 2003 imposed notiﬁcation
obligations on foreign-related, but not
purely domestic, merger and acquisition
transactions. Under the 2003 Interim
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors, notiﬁcation to the Ministry of
Commerce and State Administration
for Industry and Commerce is required
for onshore transactions based on the
amount of operating revenues in China,
the number of investments in China in
the relevant industry, and market share.

Notiﬁcation for offshore transactions
may also be required if the acquiring
company’s assets or turnover in China
exceed certain thresholds. The initial
review period is 30 days, after which no
response is deemed an approval. As of
this writing, our understanding is that no
notiﬁed transaction has been rejected
or altered by the Chinese authorities.
Chapter 4 of the AML will establish
new procedures for merger clearance
for all transactions, both domestic and
foreign. This Chapter is a substantial
improvement from earlier drafts in
which the standards and procedures for
merger review were extremely opaque.
There are still concerns, however. The
thresholds for notiﬁcation and calculation
of turnover in Article 24 still do not
require a sufﬁcient nexus to domestic
commerce and appear inconsistent with
the International Competition Network’s
(ICN) recommended practices, which
seek to establish an international norm
for the review of multinational mergers.
The Draft also relies on subjective market
share thresholds for merger notiﬁcation,
which the ICN advises against because
they are difﬁcult to apply in practice.
The Draft provides for an initial review
period of 45 days instead of the 30 days
provided under the current law. Most
merger control regimes now have a 30-day
initial review period. While an additional
15 days may not pose serious problems in
most transactions, it would be desirable
for China to conform its review period
to the emerging international norm.

Administration and Enforcement
Chapter 6 outlines how the AntiMonopoly Authority will be administered.
Article 36 of the Draft provides for the
establishment of a single Anti-Monopoly
Authority (Authority) that (1) formulates
anti-monopoly policies and rules; (2)

7. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Ofﬁces of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 504 U.S. 398 (2004).
8. See Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 166 (Apr. 29, 2004).
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investigates anti-monopoly matters; (3)
handles cases in violation of the law;
(4) investigates and evaluates market
competition conditions; (5) conducts
international exchanges and cooperation
with foreign jurisdictions and negotiations
of multilateral and bilateral agreements on
competition; and (6) handles other antimonopoly matters in connection with the
law. Article 38 grants the Authority further
powers of inspection to search residences
and business locations, to access and retain
relevant evidence, and to inquire about
bank account information. This uniﬁed
structure seems more likely to result in
greater efﬁciency and consistency than
the division of regulatory authority among
several government agencies, as provided
in some earlier versions of the law. But the
broad discretionary powers granted to the
Authority also highlight that the Authority’s
staff will have great inﬂuence over how
the law is enforced. It is important, for
example, that the Authority’s staff
include professionally-trained economists
who understand how markets work.
The Draft provides some checks on
the Authority’s power. The Authority’s
investigators must keep a written record
of their investigation (Article 40), keep
trade secrets conﬁdential (Article 41), and
publish the Authority’s decisions on the
day of issuance (Article 43). The Draft also
provides undertakings investigated by the
Authority with certain rights, including the
right to submit statements and defenses
to the Authority (Article 42) and the
right to administrative judicial review in an
intermediate people’s court. The existence
of these provisions is a positive sign, though
they would be more reassuring if they also
required, for example, that the Authority’s
decisions lay bare the Authority’s reasoning.
Chapter 7 describes the penalties for
violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law.
Prohibited abuses of dominant market
position face a required cease and desist
order, and may also face ﬁnes of between
RMB 100,000 and RMB 10,000,000, not to
exceed 10% of the turnover in the relevant
market in the proceeding year (Article
47). Prohibited monopolistic agreements

This letter is for general informational purposes only
and does not represent our legal advice as to any
particular set of facts, nor does this letter represent
any undertaking to keep recipients advised as to all
relevant legal developments.

face the same penalties, plus a mandatory
invalidation of the agreement (Article 46).
Merging undertakings that either failed to
notify the Authority when required, or
failed to comply with the obligations the
Authority set out in its decision to allow
the merger, also face harsh mandatory
penalties. The Authority will (1) declare
the concentration concerned void, and
(2) order the undertakings concerned
(A) to dispose whole or part of its stock,
(B) to transfer part of the business, (C)
to dismiss the persons responsible from
their positions and/or (D) to impose
other necessary penalties. In addition,
the Authority may also impose ﬁnes of
between RMB 100,000 to RMB 10,000,000,
not to exceed 10% of the turnover in
the relevant market in the preceding year
(Article 48). All three of these provisions
also declare that any conduct in connection
with the violation of the anti-monopoly law
that “constitute criminal offences” shall be
investigated for criminal liability (Article 49).

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP is
a Delaware limited liability partnership. Our
UK offices are operated under a separate
Delaware limited liability partnership.
© 2005 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

The Draft also authorizes the Authority
to order investigated parties to comply
with investigations and provide materials
and information, and to impose ﬁnes up
to RMB 1 million for failure to comply
(Article 51). With such potentially harsh
penalties available under the law, clarity of
statutory language and transparency and
consistency of enforcement will be vital.

Conclusion

CHINA PRACTICE
UPDATE

While the Draft shows signiﬁcant progress
from the 2002 version, and demonstrates
that the Chinese government has taken the
comments it has received seriously, the law
still needs further improvement in order
to be brought into line with international
standards before enactment. As we move
forward, it is critical that we maintain an
ongoing dialogue between China and
international anti-monopoly experts to
ensure that China remains a welcoming
environment for foreign investment
and a safe home for competition.

For more information on the proposed
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, contact
either of the attorneys below.
Washington:
William Kolasky
1 202 663 6357
william.kolasky@wilmerhale.com
Beijing:
Lester Ross
86 10 8529 7588
lester.ross@wilmerhale.com

Pamela Bookman, a summer associate
at the ﬁrm, contributed to the research
and drafting of this bulletin.

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE
AND DORR
LLP
Hosted by
The Berkeley
Electronic
Press

5

